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REVIEWS
OPTIONS ON THE BERLIN PRuBLEM: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

STEPHEN R. BOWERS

Few post-War European disputes have received greater long-term
attention that the question of the division of Berlin. During
numerous crises, Berlin has been regarded as the greatest existing
threat to peace and during the era of detente it has been touted as a
barometer of East-West relations. There has always been
considerable rhetoric about the need to "resolve" the Berlin problem
or, as Khrushchev said, to "normalise" the Berlin situation. The 1971
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has been seen by many as an
important step in the long approach to a solution. The contributions
of this agreement are carefull examined by Honore M. Catudal, Jr.
in A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (Berlin:
Berlin Verlag, 1978). Although the scope of Catudal's study is
narrow, his examination does help the reader chart the evolution of
the Berlin situation in terms of several scenarios for possible
resolution of this problem.
There are three basic matters relating to the implementation of
the Quadripartite Agreement examined in this book. First is the
question of transportation between West Berlin and the Federal
Republic of Germany. Four charters, tho'se related to access controls,
rail transport, waterways, and air traffic, are devoted to this. The
second topic is personal concerns such as private communications
and living conditions and is covered in two chapters, one dealing with
freedom of movement between East and West Berlin and the other
with resolution of such urban problems as sewage disposal. Finally,
in three chapters the study examines a number of legal and political
questions ranging from consular representation of West Berlin to th~
role of the West Berlin question in major foreign policies. The
interesting text of the book is supplemented by a 150 page section of
appendices including a chronology of events from 1943 to 1978,
official texts of various statements on Berlin, and ten tables of dataon trade and traffic of Berlin.
In order to consider where Berlin is today, it is useful to analyse
the full ntnge of possible options for resolution of the question of
*A review of Honore M. Catudal, Jr. A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978)
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the status of the city. From the East German viewpoint, the most
desirable solution is total incorporation of West Berlin into the GDR.
The tangible benefits are obvious: the territory and people 'of West
Berlin would be added to the CDR. The psychological gains are even
more impressive. First, there would be a considerable increase in East
German prestige as its capital city becomes the largest in both
Germanies. Second, this enhanced prestige would do much to dispel
notions of the GDR as a "rump" nation created from a fragment of
the once enormous unified Germany. Elimination of West Berlin as a
"Pan-Germanic symbol" constitutes still another value of this option.
It is also easy to see the political gain accruing to the SED regime as
the hated Berlin Wall is removed. The significance of such an action
would be felt not only by Berliners and Germans, but also by the
many foreign VIsItors who have viewed the Wall. A fifth
psychological advantage comes with the elimination of what Erich
Honecker has described as a "thorn in the flesh of the GDR .. : ."
For years SED leaders have expressed concern about the use of West
Berlin by escape organisations, espionage services, and
non-Communist radio a'nd television stations. With total
incorporation, such a situation would no longer exist. Finally, the
SED regime would benefit from this option by ending its continuing
dependency on the USSR as its representative in Four-Power
.negotiations on Berlin.
.
There is, however, one possible loss for the SED associated with
this resolution. Many observers have commented ·that the SED has
grown accustomed to tension since its creation and still needs a
degree of tension to compensate for the absence of a durable sense of
national identity. West Berlin;s presence has provided the leadership
its best opportunity for occasional confrontation with the West as a
means of stressing that "enemies" were in their midst. The SED has
been able to create a sense of .tension by expressing alarm at West
Berlin-based spies, agents, and provocateurs. Without West Berlin as a
"thorn in the flesh", the SED might be deprived of a useful unifying
element.
The fundamental problem of this option is its feasibility. A
diminished Western interest in West Berlin is required for fulfillment
of this scenario, either disinterest permitting a sudden Eastern
military move on West Berlin or one promoting a Western trade-off
of West Berlin for some corresponding Eastern concession elsewhere.
Catudal's study provides firm evidence that no such loss of Western
interest has yet occurred. He notes, for example, the Allied insistence
in 1975 that the Senate of West Berlin reject an East German legal
formulation declaring the Berlin Wall a "state frontier" in the middle
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of Berlin because acceptance would have implied reduced Western
responsibility for Berlin. (pp.l02~103)
Another possible scenario for resolution of this problem is
incorporation of West Berlin into the GDR by a territorial exchange.
It is not inconceivable that the GDR might agree to yield some of its
territory in, order to acquire West Berlin. A population transfer
would be necessary to avoid the sort of incidents associated with .
construction of the Berlin Wall and the securing of the East-West
German frontier in the GDR's early years. Such an exchange would
be characterised by orderliness and bi-Iateral negotiations between
East and West Germany. A most cordial East-West atmosphere
would be a pre-condition for such an exchange and the four
occupying powers would have to agree to surrender their rights in
Berlin. .
The principal advantages of this plan over the previous one are,
first, that no East-West confrontation is required and, second, that
this proposal serves the interests of the current policies of detente.
These factors greatly increase the feasibility of this alternative. All
the gains which the GDR would have enjoyed under the previous
option are p-reserVed in this plan with two exceptions. First, East
Germany would not gain the West Berlin population and, second,
since an orderly population transfer is envisaged, it is reasonable to
conclude that much of the material wealth of the city, including
industrial installations, would be removed. However, the primary
disadvantage is that the FRG would have to be recognised as the
power with the right to act on the disposition of the West Berlin
issue. As Catudal's study on the Quadripartite Agreement indicates,
there would be a reluctance on the part of the USSR and the GDR to
accept such a proposition.
A Communist controlled West Berlin is a third scenario for
resolution of the Berlin problem. With this option West Berlin'
continues to exist as an essentially separate city with its own
government. Control would be exercised through the Socialist Unity
Party of West Berlin (SEW), the West Berlin branch of the GDR's
SED. Allied rights in Berlin would become a special concern since a
continuation of four-power duties would probably be opposed by
the dominant West Berlin political forces.
How could the ·SEW gain control of West Berlin? Political and.
economic turmoil would be necessary to produce a favourable
climate. Should the West suffer a serious economic depression, West
Berlin would be affected and the SEW might, as a result, take control
through the electoral process. The SEW would certainly be able to
count on substantial support from the GDR and the latter could even
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. attempt to subvert the political process to aid the SEW. The GDR
and the USSR might promise the city that it would enjoy special
benefits as a result of showing its "political maturity" and electing
the SEW. The prospect of removal of the Berlin Wall or the
institution of other improvements in West Berlin's status might be
raised as incentives to vote for the SEW. Catudal demonstrates the
desire of the West Berlin Senate for local improvements and his
account of such progress in overcoming the rupture of East and West
Berlin does reveal the prospects for a gradual incorporation of West
Berlin into the CDR. The latter point is significant because there
would be a serious question regarding the permanence of a separate
SEW· controlled West Berlin.
The advantages of this scenario over the previous ones are that
it involves no serious· East-West confrontation, it requires no
territorial exchanges, nor does it demand recognition of the FRG as
the custodian of West Berlin's interests. The GDR still enjoys the
benefits of an increase in its real estate, enhanced prestige and
stability, and the removal of the "thorn in its flesh". Removal of the
Wall would also be possible once "hostile elements" in West Berlin
were subdued.
Failing to gain full political control of the city, the GDR and
the USSR might be content with a "Finlandised" West Berlin. This
resolution requires neither a social nor a political transformation of
West Berlin. In this variation, West Berlin's relations with the East are
cordial and its trade with East Germany is of special importance.
Four·Power control and Western troops have been eliminated and
West Berlin is regarded as a sovereign political entity.
However, in spite of West Berlin's independence and neutrality,
it is subject to Communist intervention in its internal affairs. Soviet
insistence on special procedures for invitations to international
congresses and contents held in West Berlin, a matter discussed by
Catudal, might be viewed as one current manifestation of this
tendency. Soviet-led boycotts of Eastern participation in West
Berlin·based events have been a convenient device when the city'S
Senate has refused to yield to pressures (pp.114-116). With West
Berlin a thoroughly "Finlandised" entity, the instruments of
coercion would become more powerful. Vital trade and economic
agreements could be jeopardised, East German representatives in
West Berlin could be re·called, or military actions could even be
mentioned if the issue seemed serious enough. The objective 0.£ such
measures would not be a physical takeover, but merely the
correction of offending policies or conditions in West Berlin. Good
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relations, of course, could be rewarded by a number of positive
actions by the GDR and its allies.
The principal advantage of this arrangement, from the East
German viewpoint, is that West Berlin would cease to be an irritant
and West Germany's presence in the city, the most disputed aspect of
the implementation of the Berlin agreement, according to Catudal
(p.123), could be completely eliminated. A "Finlandised" West
Berlin might emerge as a result of continued East-West detente
combined with Allied neglect of West Berlin. No upheavals in West
Berlin or GDR-Soviet pressures are required. In fact, Communist
benignity would do more to advance this development since it would
foster the belief that West Berlin could co-exist peacefully with its
neighbours .. The six years of successful implementation of the
Quadripartite Agreement discussed by Catudal might constitute a
significant contribution to the encouragement of such a belief.
Less advantageous to the GDR is the possible solution of this
problem by establishing West Berlin as a "free city" under United
Nations sponsorship. This alternative would involve an
internationally sponsored effort to perpetuate what is essentially the
status quo. The Four-Power status of Berlin would be terminated by
the establishment of a UN protectorate and transit rights would be
guaranteed by the UN. Such an arrangement could come about as a
product of detente and Western efforts to provide a stable
foundation for West Berlin's independence.
As with the previous scenario, East Germany would no longer
be dependent on the USSR as sole protector of its interests regarding
West Berlin. The basic problem of West Berlin is not removed by this
development, but it is at least out of the hands of the East Germans,
the Soviets, and the Western powers. In the UN the Soviet-led bloc
would have to act jointly to advance the GDR's interests, thus the
SED regime would remain dependent on the USSR for support in the
,General Assembly and the Security Council. However, the USSR
alone would not be able to guarantee protection of East German
positions. Therefore, the GDR's dependence would be diluted as
appeals must be made to a variety of groups to secure support.
Overall, the GDR's independence would be increased by
implementation of this pr,ogramme. Moreover, removal of Western
troops from West Berlin would, by itself, be a victory for East
Germany. In addition, the East Germans profit here by not having to
recognise a special FRG-West Berlin relationship. UN sponsorship,
to a great degree, would internationalise the Berlin question. Of
course, there is also a negative side to this option for the GDR since
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the SED would be deprived of the material gains offered by total
incorporation and UN supervision would make future unilateral
Communist moves against West Berlin more difficult. The same
'would also be true of Western moves regarding West Berlin. From
Catudal's account, it appears likely that the West, however, would
welcome such a solution as a means of reducing its 'already
considerable burdens. The East, which, according to Catudal, is
intent on severing West Berlin's ties with the FRG (pp.133-134)
might view this as a device for firmly establishing the fact of West
Berlin's complete separation from West Germany.
Still less favourable for the GDR is the prospect of West Berlin
as a part of an East-West German confederation. This would bring
re-amalgamation of Berlin by re-unification of both Germanies in a
genuine confederation. Straight population would be the most
appropriate formula for apportioning seats in an all-German
legislature but this approach would reduce the political forces of the
GDR to permanent minority status.
The effect of this option on GDR-Soviet relations would be
revolutionary since the GDR would cease to exist as a separate
entity. The principal concern would now be all-German-Soviet
relations.
The only advantage of this plan for the East Germans is that
they would have a chance to win control of both West Berlin and
West Germany by becoming the dominant force in the
confederation. Their dominance would produce a Communist
Germany that could possibly be very independent of the USSR. This
independence would be a function of the fact that, first, power, if
legally attained, would likely have come without major Soviet
assistance and, second, the united Germany would be considerably
stronger economically and politically. However, the prospects for an
SED victory would not be good thus raising the very real possibility
that the SED would lose everything. This near certainty is enough to
prevent serious East German or Soviet consideration of a
confederation.
The final scenario, almost totally opposite from the first, is the
establishment of West Berlin as a Land of the FRG. As Catudal's
description of the status quo demonstrates, West Berlin is a long way
from this. Realisation of this option would require that West Berlin
have voting representatives in the West German legislature and that
the FRG acquire extraterritorial rights on at least one corridor.from
Berlin to the FRG. The West German military would also have to be
introduced into West Berlin and, with the necessary termination of
. Four-Power control,.Allied troops would leave West Berlin.
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This would be unlikely during an era of detente. It requires a
complete reversal of the Western policy outlined by Catudal and,
simultaneously, a considerable weakening of the USSR's
international position. The creation of an FRG Land in West Berlin
would have an immediate deleterious effect on GDR-Soviet
relations. The SED would view this as a failure by the USSR to
protect vital East German interests and might feel impelled to pursue
its interests independently. However, a weak USSR, feeling Western
pressure, would see any deviations from its policy line as
unaffordable luxuries. The GDR, meanwhile, would suffer a
tremendous psychological defeat and tohe permanence of the GDR
would be placed in serious doubt as the Pan-Germanic role of West
Berlin is re-emphasised. The domestic restiveness in the GDR noted
by Catudal (pp.136-137) might become even more serious.
There is, however, another possibility concerning this option.
Should West Berlin become a Land of a "Finlandised" West
Germany, the impact on the GDR and the implementation
requirements would be different. First, union with a neutral FRG
would be possible during the current detente and would not require
Eastern weakness. Second, under these circumstances there need not
be a deterioration of West German-Soviet relations. The USSR
could present this action as part of a long-term programme for
advancement of East German interests and a prelude to creation of a
re-unified Communist Germany.
The above scenarios are not a concern of A Balance Sheet of the
QJtadripartite Agreement on Berlin. They should, however, help
illuminate 'the developments which Catudal does discuss as they
relate to the overall progression of the Berlin question toward a
future resolution. At the same time, a careful reading of Catudal's
excellent study provides a useful framework for understanding the
contemporary disposition of what continues to be one of the
significant post-World War Two issues.

